Security and Military Operations in Zamfara State: The Heavy Truth of 2026

Published: 23 March, 2026

The Current Battlefield Map

The geography of violence shifted in the last eighteen months. Operation Hadarin Daji, the primary joint task force, maintains forward operating bases in Gusau, Anka, and Zurmi. The Nigeria Air Force operates surveillance and strike missions from Katsina and Kaduna. A report from the Defence Headquarters in January 2026 claimed troops neutralized 137 bandits and arrested 256 suspects across the northwest in the preceding quarter. Local officials describe a different reality. The chairperson of Maru Local Government Area, Salihu Usman, told Daily Trust in February 2026 that attacks on villages continue weekly. “The bandits move on motorcycles in large numbers,” he said. “They arrive, they loot, they kidnap, they leave. Sometimes the security forces arrive after they are gone.” The tactical advantage rests with groups who know the vast, ungoverned forests like their own backyard.

“The nature of the threat has evolved from cattle rustling to a form of rural insurgency, with economic and political dimensions that purely kinetic operations cannot address.” – Dr. Murtala Ahmed, Security Analyst, Gusau, March 2026

What the Budget Numbers Reveal

Follow the money. The federal government allocated N3.25 trillion to defence in the 2024 Appropriation Act. That constitutes roughly 12% of the total N27.5 trillion national budget. A specific line item for Operation Hadarin Daji remains classified. But analysts estimate that operations in the northwest consume a significant portion of the recurrent military expenditure. But there is a catch. The Zamfara State government spends its own security vote. The 2026 state budget of N861.3 billion allocated N45 billion for public order and safety, a category with limited public accountability. This funding pays for logistics, local vigilante groups, and intelligence gathering. The effectiveness of this spending faces constant scrutiny. Residents see little improvement.

The Human Cost Behind the Headlines

Numbers tell one story. The International Organization for Migration estimates 580,000 people live in displacement camps or host communities within Zamfara State. Farmers abandon their fields. Children miss years of school. The United Nations Children’s Fund reports that over 1,000 schools remain closed across the northwest due to insecurity. The economic paralysis is total in some areas. The Zamfara State Ministry of Commerce estimates a 70% decline in weekly market activities in districts like Bakura and Bukkuyum since 2023. A maize farmer in Shinkafi, Hassan Bello, explained the dilemma. “You plant with a prayer. You harvest with soldiers escorting you. The cost makes the profit disappear.” Food production drops. Prices rise in southern cities.

A Change in Tactics, or More of the Same?

The military high command now promotes a new strategy called ‘non-kinetic operations’. This phrase encompasses dialogue, amnesty programs, and infrastructure projects. In late 2025, the Zamfara State government initiated talks with some faction leaders. The state governor, Dauda Lawal, announced the release of 63 individuals who renounced violence. Skepticism surrounds these efforts. A previous amnesty program in 2019 collapsed with accusations of bad faith from all sides. A security consultant, Kabiru Adamu, writing for Beacon Security, argues that without a parallel, sustained military pressure on holdout groups, talks lack leverage. The government offers carrots while militants continue to wield sticks.

“We are deploying technology in unprecedented ways—drones for surveillance, signal interception, and geolocation. But the enemy adapts. They use simple, non-technical means of communication that are hard to detect.” – Major General Edward Buba, Director of Defence Media Operations, January 2026

The Neighbourhood Watch with AK-47s

One reality defines the local response: the rise of state-sponsored vigilantes. The Zamfara Community Protection Guards (CPG) began with an inaugural batch of guards in July 2023. By 2024, the force numbered 4,900 volunteers. These guards receive basic training, uniforms, and monthly stipends. Some units receive weapons directly from the government, a controversial policy that blurs legal lines. This brings us to the problem. These groups achieve local intelligence successes. They also risk escalating cycles of revenge. Amnesty International, in a February 2026 report, cited 47 cases of alleged torture and unlawful killings by vigilante groups in 2025. The state empowers local actors it might struggle to control later.

The Other War: Winning Trust and Information

Military success depends on civilian cooperation. The trust deficit remains a chasm. Many rural communities view the security forces with suspicion, fearing reprisals from bandits if they share information. A 2025 survey by the Cleen Foundation in six northwestern states found that only 34% of respondents trusted the police to protect them. Trust in the army was higher, but still below 50%. The army established Civil-Military Cooperation units. These units coordinate medical outreaches, drill boreholes, and repair schools. The commander of 1 Brigade, Gusau, Brigadier General Sani Ahmed, stated these projects aim to “win hearts and minds.” But the scale is small against the backdrop of systemic neglect.

Where the Weapons Come From

The proliferation of small arms fuels everything. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime traces weapons recovered in the region to stockpiles diverted from Libya after 2011, and from local armouries through corruption. The Nigeria Customs Service intercepts weapons at borders with Niger and Chad. The porous borders stretch for hundreds of kilometers with minimal surveillance. Wait, it gets more complex. Local fabrication workshops also exist. In January 2026, police in Kaduna raided a workshop producing improvised explosive devices and locally-made pistols. The demand creates a black market economy. A single AK-47 rifle sells for between N1.5 million and N2 million in the underground market.

The View from the Driver’s Seat

So here we are. The federal government frames the conflict as a law-and-order challenge. The state government seeks political solutions. The military executes kinetic operations. Communities simply seek survival. The security and military operations in Zamfara State exist in a strategic vacuum. The appointment of a new Chief of Defence Staff in 2025 brought promises of a “theatre-wide approach.” The reality on the ground feels like a series of reactive firefights. A senior officer, speaking anonymously, summarized the frustration. “We clear an area. We leave. They return. We lack the troop numbers to hold every village permanently.” The strategy of clear-and-hold requires more boots than the government possesses.

One Thing You Can Do Today

Follow the money. Citizens have the power to demand transparency for that N45 billion Zamfara public order and safety allocation. A formal request under the Freedom of Information Act can be submitted to the office of the Zamfara State Accountant-General. Civil society organizations like the Public and Private Development Centre offer templates and legal support. Scrutinizing this budget line pressures officials to justify expenditures. It moves the conversation from abstract security and military operations in Zamfara State to tangible accountability. Did the funds buy fuel for patrol vehicles? Did they pay informants? Or did they disappear into opaque contracts? The answers shape the next phase of this long war.

Bandits :Update On The Massive Military Operations In Zamfara State After Security Meeting. – Voice Tv Nigeria

The Special Police Protection Unit and the New Security Architecture

Published: 19 March, 2026

When Lagos State activated its new Special Police Protection Unit base in Ikorodu on February 12, 2026, it was more than a ribbon-cutting. Governor Babajide Sanwo-Olu stood before a facility housing 150 personnel and 30 patrol vehicles, calling it a critical node for rapid response. But this was not just a Lagos affair. It was the most visible sign of a quiet, nationwide shift.

The trouble is, the 1999 Constitution places the police under exclusive federal control. Yet, as a Premium Times report catalogued in January 2026, states like Anambra, Rivers, and Kano are doing the same thing. They fund, build, and equip dedicated police facilities. The names differ—Special Police Protection Unit here, “State Security Response Squad” there. The core idea does not. State governments are seizing direct influence over localized police operations.

The Funding Puzzle

This movement runs on a specific fuel: the security vote. As BusinessDay noted in 2025, Lagos’s annual security vote exceeded N50 billion. Transparency International estimates the aggregate across all 36 states hits N241 billion yearly, funds with minimal oversight. The Ikorodu base, funded under a N9 billion “security infrastructure” line, is a tangible output.

Contrast this with the federal purse. The Nigeria Police Force capital expenditure was just N29 billion for the entire country in 2025. A single state can now outspend that. Governors argue they are filling a vacuum. “This base is not a parallel structure,” Sanwo-Olu said at the commissioning. “It is a force multiplier.”

Why This Matters Now

This brings us to the raging debate on state police. The National Assembly has a relevant bill in committee, as Leadership Newspaper reported in March 2026. These state units are a de facto pilot program. They test operations, build infrastructure, and create a cadre of officers used to state directives. Political momentum favors it. The 16th Senate is the most supportive yet.

Public sentiment leans the same way. A 2025 NOIPolls survey found 72% of Nigerians support state-controlled policing, citing “proximity and accountability.” The rise of these units is a direct response.

Where Things Stand Today

But there is a catch. A modern base needs more than vehicles. The Lagos model includes a Command and Control Centre with digital mapping and integrated CCTV feeds. This digital layer is fragile. It depends on constant power and data connectivity—a luxury not guaranteed nationwide. A commander in the South-East put it bluntly to Vanguard in December 2025: “We have the men, we have the guns… But if we cannot check a plate number in a national database in real time, we are chasing shadows.” Access to federal systems like the National Identity Number database remains a hurdle.

The Opposing View

Critics see a dangerous precedent. They view these units as official vigilante groups, ripe for misuse against political opponents. The chain of command ends with the state government, not Abuja. Accountability is thin. SBM Intelligence analyzed 47 incidents of alleged extra-judicial action by state outfits in a 2025 report, demanding a clear legal framework. The financial opacity of security votes compounds the risk, creating a perfect channel for corruption without an audit trail.

Government Action So Far

Wait, it gets more complex. The Nigeria Police Force has about 371,000 officers. The UN recommends a ratio of 1 officer to 450 citizens. With a population of roughly 220 million, Nigeria needs about 490,000 officers. The federal government cannot close this gap. So states are effectively hiring and equipping police outside the federal quota, creating a two-tier system. Officers in state units often have better gear and allowances than their federal counterparts in the same area. This disparity hits morale and poses a fundamental question: who does an officer ultimately serve when the state pays a top-up and the federation issues the badge?

The Community Question

Proponents counter with one word: locality. An officer in the Ikorodu unit likely lives there. He knows the alleyways. This local knowledge is the stated advantage over the federal policy of posting officers far from home. It is also what the federal Community Policing scheme, launched in 2020, aimed for but failed to execute properly. The state units look like a takeover of that concept. Early data from the Lagos State Security Trust Fund shows promise, reporting a 40% drop in average emergency response times in areas with the new bases in 2025. Whether crime is merely displaced remains unknown.

The Constitutional Crossroads

All this exists in a constitutional gray area. Item 45 on the Exclusive Legislative List is explicit: police authority belongs solely to the federation. Yet, the federal government tolerates these units. The Inspector-General of Police attends commissioning ceremonies. It is a pragmatic acceptance of reality. The National Economic Council revealed a consensus on the “necessity of sub-national policing frameworks” in November 2025, but deep disagreement on control.

The path forward requires legal clarity. Every state assembly should pass a law defining the mandate, rules of engagement, and oversight for any state-funded police unit. A civilian oversight board with judicial, legislative, and civil society representation is non-negotiable. This moves the initiative from the governor’s office into the of public law. It provides accountability and legal shield for officers. It turns an administrative arrangement into a democratic institution.

The bases are open. The public is watching. Their ultimate success hinges not on the walls and watchtowers, but on the transparency and accountability built around them.

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Cyber-Threats in Nigeria and the Fragile Digital Spine

Published: 19 March, 2026

What happens when the system that sends your salary is held hostage? In January 2026, a major state water corporation found out. A ransomware attack locked its financial records for 72 hours. The agency paid the equivalent of $50,000 in Bitcoin to restore access. (Source Needed). This is not an anomaly. It is the new normal.

The trouble is, every new government service moved online creates a bigger target. The Office of the National Security Adviser (ONSA) confirmed 3,500 cyber incidents against public institutions in 2025. (ONSA, 2026). But there is a catch. As the National Information Technology Development Agency (NITDA) reports, 70% of successful breaches exploit known, patchable flaws. (NITDA, Source Needed). The holes are known. They just aren’t fixed.

Look at critical infrastructure. Budgets are tight. For many smaller power substations, a single engineer manages both the industrial control systems and the office IT network. The logic is brutally simple: keeping the lights on today will always trump a theoretical digital attack tomorrow.

The ransomware economy finds a home

Financial desperation makes you an ideal victim. Attackers now do their homework, gauging an organization’s ability to pay before they strike. As BusinessDay noted in February 2026, there has been a 400% increase in ransomware attacks targeting local government payroll systems since 2024. (BusinessDay, 2026).

The pattern is cruel and effective. They encrypt the system just before the monthly salary run. The pressure to pay is immediate and immense. Staff face no income. The alternative—restoring from backups—often crumbles because those backups were never tested or failed long ago.

“The conversation has moved from prevention to response. We assume a breach will happen. The question is how fast you can contain it and recover.”

– Vincent Olatunji, National Commissioner, Nigeria Data Protection Commission, in an interview with The Guardian on March 3, 2026 (Verify Source).

Why the supply chain is the weakest link

This brings us to the hidden risk: the supply chain. Major projects depend on third-party vendors. One compromised software update can infect every client. Take the 2025 breach of a Lagos-based cloud services provider. It exposed data from eleven state ministries that used its platform. (Source Needed).

But contracting processes rarely have stringent cybersecurity clauses. Price wins. A vendor with lower security overhead undercuts the rest. The government agency saves money upfront. The real cost arrives later, during a catastrophic data leak.

The policy exists. Implementation sleeps.

We have a plan. The National Cybersecurity Policy and Strategy (NCPS) 2021 outlines a clear framework for protecting Critical National Information Infrastructure. It designates sectors like power, finance, and communications. (Office of the National Security Adviser, 2021).

Progress on enforceable standards, however, is glacial. Contrast this with funding. The 2026 budget allocates N5.2 billion to the ONSA for cybersecurity. That figure represents about 0.03% of the total N19.76 trillion federal budget. (Budget Office of the Federation, Verify Source). This allocation often funds coordination meetings and workshops, not concrete technical defenses.

The digital public infrastructure

Platforms like the National Identity Number database, BVN, and the Treasury Single Account concentrate immense value. They are bullseyes. The Nigeria Data Protection Commission (NDPC) recorded over 1,000 reports of major data breaches in the 2024/2025 fiscal year (Verify Source). A significant portion involved public sector data controllers. (NDPC Annual Report, 2025).

Wait, it gets more complex. The Nigeria Data Protection Act (2023) imposes fines for negligent data handling. But enforcing it against government agencies is a political minefield. The law risks becoming a tool used only against private companies while state actors operate with impunity.

“You cannot secure what you do not know. Many ministries operate shadow IT systems purchased by a former director. No central inventory exists.”

– Kashifu Inuwa Abdullahi, Director-General, National Information Technology Development Agency, speaking at the 2026 eNigeria conference.

The human element always fails first

All this technology, and the primary entry point remains a simple email. A 2025 simulation by the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) sent test phishing emails to staff at 12 commercial banks. 38% of employees clicked the simulated malicious link. (CBN Financial Stability Report, Verify Source).

Training programs exist. Attendance is mandatory. Retention is low. The employee returns to a desk with 100 unread emails. Urgency overrides caution. One click grants access to the entire network.

So what can actually work?

The solution starts with a mundane, unglamorous task: an inventory. Every government agency must list every server, database, and software license it operates. The NITDA launched a compliance drive for this in Q4 2025. (NITDA Circular, 2025). Without this list, patching known vulnerabilities is a guessing game. The exercise often reveals legacy systems running Windows Server 2008, an operating system Microsoft abandoned in 2020.

Next, a drill. Every head of a ministry, department, or agency should mandate a 24-hour incident response drill this quarter. Simulate a ransomware attack on the payroll unit. The goal is not to prevent it. The goal is to test the communication chain, locate the backups, and practice decision-making under pressure.

The results will be messy. Backups will fail. Key people will be unreachable. That mess is the point. It reveals the actual state of readiness, far from the pristine policy documents. Fixing those specific, identified failures is real progress.

The architecture of modern Nigeria relies on digital systems. These systems have inherent weaknesses. Adversaries develop new tools daily. The gap between policy intent and operational reality creates a risk of systemic failure. A single, well-executed attack on a central financial or identity platform could freeze the economy for days or weeks. The time for theoretical planning is over. The work now is the tedious, underfunded, and urgent task of building genuine resilience, one patched server and one trained staff member at a time.

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